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OF PROSECUTORS AND SPECIAL PROSECUTORS: AN
ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
H. GEOFFREY MOULTON,JR.* AND DANIEL C. RICHMAN*
The Independent Counsel (I'C) statute,t designed to restore public trust in the
impartial administration of criminal justice after Watergate, ultimately fueled
rather than quieted the perception that partisan politics drives the investigation
of high-ranking government officials. Congress, in an inspiring display of
bipartisanship, bid it a muted farewell. The statute's fate was sealed by the
enormous controversy surrounding the investigation conducted by Independent
Counsel Kenneth Starr.
Although Starr did not bring criminal charges against President Clinton, his
office went pretty far in that direction, committing considerable enforcement
resources to that end," bringing criminal charges against people believed to have
information that would implicate Clinton, and deploying arguments of
prosecutorial prerogative that have significandy changed the Iegal Iandscape."
Like many others, we have found this exercise of prosecutorial power terribly
troubling. Also troubling, however, is the difficulty we (and others) have had in
identifying "neutral principles'?" of prosecutorial discretion that Starr violated.
The standard criticisms of Starr's investigation do not meet that measure. The
standard criticisms of the I'C mechanism generally, though possessing greater
force, are similarly unsatisfying. This essay, written from the perspective of two
former federal prosecutors.i springs from our effort to identify the fundamental
* Associate Professor, Widener University School of Law.
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School ofLaw. The authors thank Erin Daly
for organizing this Symposium and for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. The Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994).
The provision was first enacted as part of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-521,
92 Stat. 1867 (1978), and was thereafter reenacted three times. See Pub. L. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039
(1983); Pub. L. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293 (1987); Pub. L. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732 (1994).
2. See, e.g., Pete Yost, Starr's Probe Soon to BecomeMost Expensive: Investigation to Top 148.5
Million Inquiry into Reagan Deals in Iran, Nicaragua, ATLANTAJ. & CaNST., Apr. 1, 1999, at A3; Connie
Cass, Stane's Outsourcing Costs: 14.2 Million, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1999, at A 10; Stephen Hedges &
Vanessa Blum, GAO Psas Clinton Probe at 139.6 Million, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1, 1998, at 6.
3. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (rejecting Independent
Counsel's argument that attorney-client privilege does not survive client's death); In ,., Sealed Case,
148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir, 1998) (upholding Independent Counsel's argument that Secret Service
officers cannot claim a protective function privilege), cert: denied,119 S.Ct 461 (1998); In ,., Lindsey,
148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding Independent Counsel's argument that Deputy White
House Counsel could not claim attorney-client privilege to protect communications between the
· President and government lawyers when questioned during grand jury investigation), em. denied,119
s. Ct. 466 (1998).
4. Cf Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral PrinciplesofConstitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1959).
5. Professor Richman was an assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of
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80 Widener Law Symposium]'oumal [Vol. 5:79
shortcomings of the IC concept, particularly as manifested in the Starr
.investigation, and to decide whether efforts to cure those shortcomings with a
new and improved version of the IC approach arewarranted,
EVALUATING STARR (AND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL ApPROACH)
For some, what made Starr's pursuit ofthe Presidentparticularlyinappropriate
(after the Whitewater investigation failed to pan out), and evinced the partisan
nature of the project, is the fact that perjury is virtually never prosecuted." And
this much is true: Given how much perjury occurs in the judicial system (yes,
even in the grand jury), the frequency with which such cases are brought is
extraordinarily low. Perjury cases have been brought, however, as House
Republicans demonstrated when they paraded a number of convicted perjurers
before the Judiciary Committee.' While each of these cases had its own unique
facts, no grand principle of prosecutorial discretion separated them from the
crimes that Starr believed Clinton to have committed.
New York from 1987 through 1992, serving as chief of the Appellate Unit from 1991 to 1992.
Professor Moulton was an assistant United States Attorney for the Eastern District ofPennsylvania
from 1986 through 1990, serving (on a temporary detail) as special counsel to the AssistantAttorney
General, Criminal Division, in 1988.
6. See, e.g., David E. Ravella, WiD He Escape This Time? Petjllry Chatge a Stretch, S'!Y Nation's
DAs, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 9, 1998, at A 1. For example, "Many say that prosecuting the president for
perjury in a civil case is unfair since such a charge against an ordinary citizen is ... almost unheard
of." Id. "[L]egal experts agree that in ordinary civil suits, lying is rampant and prosecution for lying
is rare. There have been at most a few dozen published court decisions over the last decade that
concern perjury and civil cases, though the total number of prosecutions could be considerably
higher." Laura Mansnerus, Testing ofa President: The Law,· Lying Rampant in Civil SlIits Bllt Prisonfor
Lying is Rare, N.Y. nMES, Feb. 22, 1998, at 22, col. 5. Lawrence Walsh was quoted saying that "In
60 years of practice, I have never known this [perjury investigation before conclusion of civil suit]
to happen. Most civil lawsuits begin with exaggerated allegations by the parties, which are narrowed
and corrected as discovery and depositions proceed." Id. This lack of investigation may occur
because"[i]f prosecutors sprang into action every time a lawyer in a civil case complained ofperjury
by an opposing witness, they'd be doing little else." Gerard E. Lynch, Letter to the Editor, A Search
for Tmth, or a Partisan Inqllisition?; ProseCliting Fren:rY, N.Y. nMES, Feb. 22, 1998, § 4, at 16.
7. Francis X. Clines, Penitents Called by GOP Speak on Perils ofPe1Jury, N.Y. nMES, Dec. 2,
1998, at A 1. Federal perjury prosecutions are indeed relatively rare. Less than one percent of
criminal matters received by U.S. Attorneys in 1996 involved perjury or contempt, seeBUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1996 Table 1.1 (1999), and less than
one-half of one percent (283 out of 56,938) of defendants were charged with those offenses, id:
Table 1.2. Such cases are more frequently brought in state systems, however. See Peter Hartlaub,
Rogan Cites Statistics on Perjllry, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 19, 1998, at N4 ("In my home state of
California, since Bill Clinton became president, there have been some 16,000 prosecutions for
perjury.") (quoting Republican CongressmanJames E. Rogan); seealsoRuth Marcus, Pqying the Price
for CivilPerjllry,· ProseClition Mtg Be Unllsllal, Bllt It Can Mean Prison, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1998, at A4.
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Part ofStarr's justification for pursuing Clinton's conduct in connection with
the PaulaJones lawsuit rested on Clinton's position as ChiefExecutive. "In view
of the enormous trust and responsibility attendant to his high Office," his report
declared, "the President has a manifest duty to insure that his conduct at all times
complies with the law of the Iand.f" Some people found evidence of
inappropriate partisanship in this explanation as well, arguing that, at least in
highly personal matters unconnected with official duties, a public official,
however high, ought not to be held to a higher standard ofconduct." Reasonable
people can differ here too.
Starr has also been attacked for his investigative tactics. Critics point
particularly to his office's interviews of Monica Lewinsky, which seemed to
include advice not to contact counsel, to the treatment of Lewinsky's mother,
designed to put pressure on the daughter, and to the leaks of grand jury
information, which are plainly unlawful, as beyond the prosecutorial pale. to Apart
from the leaks, however, which themselves are not unprecedented, Starr's tactics
seem largely within the mainstream (at least for cases that prosecutors deem
important to bring). The claim that the tactics, in and of themselves,
demonstrate partisanship (rather than aggressiveness) itself has a distinctly
partisan flavor.
As we step back and consider the broader implications ofStarr's inquiry, what
is most striking is not how one comes out on these questions of prosecutorial
discretion, but rather how ill-equipped we all are at corning up with clear (and
thus demonstrably non-partisan) answers to them. Our difficulty here is not just
that any claim to a normative theory ofprosecution requires some articulation of
a more general theory ofcriminal justice. Even without such a theory, one might
significantly advance the discussion with a mere description of how "regular"
prosecutors normally act and, by extension, how a prosecutor untainted byStarr's
alleged partisanship would have acted. But we can't even do that.
Just flip through the United States Attorneys' Manual- a tome that the two
of us tried not to disturb when we were federal prosecutors but one that could
provide a starting place for such positivist policy discussions. Although every so
8. COMMUNICATION FROM KENNETII W. STARR, INDEPENDENT COUNSEL,
TRANSMfITING A REFERRAL TO THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REpRESENTATIVES FILED IN
CONFORMI1Y WITII TIlE REQUIREMENTS OF TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, SECfION 595(c),
H.R. Doc. No. 105-310, at 7 (1998). See also it/. ("The Presidency is more than an executive
responsibility. It is the inspiring symbol of all that is highest in American purpose and ideals.")
(quoting Herbert Hoover) (citation omitted).
9. See, e.g., Geraldo Rivera, Letter to the Editor, A Search For Tl7lth, or a Partisall lllqllisition:
Sex, Lies and Tapes, N.Y. nMES, Feb. 22, 1998, § 4, at 16 (arguing that the President is neither above
nor below the law, and noting: "Bill Clinton may have much to answer for, but the only person with
an absolute right to ask the questions is his wife.").
1o. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, Hardball at the Ritz Pets Starr on the Spot, WASH. POST, Sept.
23, 1998, at A 1; Richard W-tlling, Stane's team: TOllghpeople, tOllgh tacticsproseClition, notpolitics, strong sllit,
USA TODAY, Feb. 16, 1998, at 6A.
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often a clear pronouncement emerges, the most marked characteristic of this
putatively authoritative guide is its mushiness (or, if you will, flexibilityj.i? The
point is not merely one ofmanual-drafting, which will be affected by a reluctance
to limit the deterrent effects of criminal legislation or to demonstrably undercut
legislative choices (however ill-considered). Even in the privacy of their own
offices, prosecutors find it hard to m.ake, and generally resist m.aking, categorical
judgments about what kinds of cases should be brought. Perhaps they could do
better. And efforts in this direction would, as David Sklansky has recently
argued, be quite salutary.12 But we have never seriously demanded that they do
so, and we have allowed the whole process to be cloaked in mystery and blessed
by vague allusions to prosecutors' broad discretion.P The positivist analysis thus
stops with a tautology: The only reliable way to see if a case would be brought
by a federal prosecutor is to present it to a "real" federal prosecutor and see if
she would bring it. And here, of course, the answer may well depend on which
prosecutor you ask.l"
Evidence of our uncertainty in this regard comes from Starr's inquiry itself.
When pressed to defend his investigation or a particular move therein, Starr and
his deputies often invoked the participation of "career" prosecutors on his staff
11. See J ed S. Rakoff, The Exercise ofProsecutorialDiscretion in FederalBusiness Fraud Prosecutions,
in CORRIGIBLE CORPORAnONS AND UNRULYLAw 179 (Brent Fisse & Peter A. French eds., 1985)
(describing u.s. Attorneys' Manual as "an unwieldy, multi-volume melange ofpolicies, guidelines,
legal analyses and helpful hints" marked by "lax and sometimes idiosyncratic" internal enforcement);
if David A. Sklansky, Sta1T, Singleton, and the Prosecutor's Role, 26 FORDHAM. URB. L.J. 509,536 (1999)
(noting extent to which discretionary questions raised by Starr's investigation are not answered by
the Justice Department's formal policies).
12. See Sklansky, supra note 11.
13. Here, "we" refers to the general public, and to those governmental actors, including
legislators, who could press theJustice Department in this regard. The academic literature contains
many cogent, and substantially unheeded, calls for clear prosecutorial guidelines. See Daniel C.
Richman, Old Chiefv. United States: Stipulating Aw'!)' ProsecstorialAccountability?, 83 VA. L. REv. 939,
959 & n.69 (1997) (citing sources).
14. Compare Hearing to ConsiderArticles ofImpeachment Before the HouseJudiciary Comm., 105 Cong.
(Dec. 9, 1998) (statement of former assistant U.S. Attorney Ronald K. Noble) ("a career federal
prosecutor, asked to investigate allegations like those in the Clinton-Lewinsky matter, would not
pursue federal criminal prosecution to the indictment or trial stage."), and id. (statement of former
U.S. Attorney and former head ofDOJ criminal division Edward S.G. Dennis) ("I think that it is
fairly clear, and that if a poll were taken of former u.S. Attorneys from any administration, you
would probably find the overwhelming number of them would agree with the assessment that this
case is a loser and just would not be sustained in court."), with id: (statement of former U.S. Attorney
and current Republican Congressman Ed Bryant) (arguing that perjury prosecution would be
supported by "compelling evidence"), and id. (statement of former u.s. Attorney and current
Republican Congressman Robert L. Barr) (accusing Noble, Dennis, and others ofignoring obvious
criminal violation and trying to find "technicalities and legalities" to excuse the President's
behavior).
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in the decisionmaking processIS-people like Michael Emmick, former head of
the public corruption unit of the Los Angeles u.s. Attorney's Office; Hickman
Ewing, former U.S. Attorney in Memphis; Jackie Bennett, Jr., former assistant
U.S. Attorney in Indianapolis and prosecutor in theJustice Department's Public
Integrity Section, and RayJahn, an experienced assistant U.S. Attorney from San
Antonio. The claim then is that the judgments of line prosecutors can be
duplicated in vitro by capturing some of thern and placing thern in the Ie's office.
This claim is not outlandish, for it was the very one that lay behind Congress's
decision to allow I'C's offices to be staffed by regular Department of Justice
(DOJ) personnel. The idea, according to the Senate Report, was "to ensure that
independent counsel cases are handled as much like other federal prosecutions
as possible.Y'"
In the end, though, the presence of "regular" prosecutors on Starr's staff
afforded him little insulation from partisan and not-so-partisan attacks. That this
is so should not be surprising. Perhaps most obviously, the presence of former
or current prosecutors does not alter the most salient feature ofan IC's office-
the singularity of its focus. While regular prosecutors, and regular prosecutors'
offices, have a wide range ofinvestigations to attend to and prioritize, the IC has
but one case, or more accurately, one principal target. This singular focus is the
central structural feature ofIe offices that both distinguishes them from regular
15. When interviewed by ABC's Diane Sawyer, for example, Starr defended the graphic
sexual detail in his report to Congress by explaining that his staff had made a "professional
judgment" that such detail was necessary. '~en Sawyer questioned the report's tone, he shot
back: 'Diane, don't fault career prosecutors for telling the truth." Howard Kurtz, Kenneth StarrOpens
Up in TV Interview, WASH. POST, Nov. 25., 1998, at D1. See also Louis Freeburg, StarrStandr His
GroundAs Demos Blast Inquiry; He Restates His Case for Impeachment, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Nov. 20,
1998 at A1 (quoting Starr as defending report as the "product of career prosecutors and
investigators"); Ruth Marcus, The Prosecutor: Following Leads Or Digging Dirt?, WASH. POST, Jan. 30,
1998, at A 1 (quoting former Starr deputyJohn D. Bates that "The independent counsel's office has
been staffed over the last several years by professional prosecutors with enormous experience who
have diligently and properly followed relevant leads in an attempt to discover the truth").
16. See S. REp. No. 103-101, at 25-26 (1993):
[An] amendment was adopted which would clarify the ability of Justice
Department employees to be detailed to an independent counsel's staff if
requested by that independent counsel. This provision was added, again, to
ensure that independent counsel cases are handled as much like other federal
prosecutions as possible and to make it clear that independent counsels should
avail themselves of the legal, investigatory and administrative expertise at the
Department.
Id; see also 28 U.S.C. § 594(d)(1) (1994) (authorizing rc to request assistance from DO]); Julie
O'Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad PolifJ, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 463, 469, 470
(1996); (explaining that "Congress would essentially like-but does not require-that I'C
investigations proceed as a DO) investigation, staffed by experienced and professional DO)
personnel, supported by DO) resources, and run according to DO) policies, except for the man or
woman at the top-who, for appearances sake, must be "independenr'").
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prosecutors' offices and maximizes the risk of overaggressive investigation and
prosecution. .
To say that, in their everyday work, regular prosecutors lack the "luxury" of
having but one case is to have it backwards. Rather, the need to consider the
opportunity costs of every case brought is a great solace to prosecutors,
particularly federal prosecutors, for WhOlD the gap between jurisdiction and
resources is the greatest.17 This constraint not only frees them from any
obligation to make absolute judgments of desert, but provides a reality check to
their judgment calls, bringing home the consequences of every decision.
Independent Counsel offices, of course, lack any such constraint, a point that
Justice Scalia made in his Morrison v. Olson dissent when he observed that the IC
mechanism "is designed to heighten, not to check, all ofthe occupational hazards
of the dedicated prosecutor; the danger of too narrow a focus, of the loss of
perspective, of preoccupation with the pursuit of one alleged suspect to the
exclusion of other interests.,,18
Other structural features of the IC's office combine with its singular focus to
create a level ofscrutiny largely unknown in the investigation ofordinary citizens.
The IC's relatively unlimited time and budget (compared to the ordinary
prosecutor's need to move cases quickly and efficiendy), and the pressure to
justify his decisions in a final report (compared to the ordinary prosecutor's
ability to rest on a longer and broader record, and to leave most decisions
unexplained) are two features frequendy mentioned.l'' Another notable feature
of Ie offices that sets them apart from most federal prosecutors' offices is the
absence of outside, detached review of significant investigative and charging
decisions. High-level investigations run out of u.s. Attorneys' offices typically
require not only internal hierarchical review but also some measure ofreview by
"Main ]ustice.,,20 That review, by individuals not otherwise invested in the
investigation, can serve as an important check on line prosecutors (or even entire
offices) fixated on nabbing a particular target.F' Here, the broader focus and
17. See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement
Discretion, 46 UCLAL. REv. 757, 765-66 (1999).
18. 487 U.S. 654, 731 (1988) (Scalia,)., dissenting) (quoting Brieffor Edward H. Levi, Griffin
B. Bell, and W"illiam French Smith as Amici Curiae). See also O'Sullivan, slljJra note 16, at 484
(CCWhere resource allocation is not an issue, such as in an IC investigation, no such constraints exist
to separate the truly criminal transgression from the case more reasonably and equitably treated
through civil sanctions.").
19. See, e.g.,O'Sullivan, slljJranote 16, at 483-85. Bob Woodward quotes Starr as demanding
an exhaustive narrative in his report to Congress as follows: cU[W]e need to have an encyclopedia.
It will show all the information. It will show how much work we did." BOB WOODWARD,
SHADOW: FIVE PRESIDENTS AND TIlE LEGACY OF WATERGATE 453 (1999).
20. See U.S. DEP7 OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.400 (1997)
[hereinafter USAM] (listing, on 36-page "Prior Approvals Chart," situations in .which U.S.
Attorneys' Offices must notify, consult with, or seek prior approval ofother components ofDOJ).
21. Additional layers of review can, on occasion, influence an investigation in the other
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institutional knowledge ofdetached DO] prosecutors can be particularly salutary.
The absence of outside review is not unique to IC offices, ofcourse. Most local
district attorney's offices face the same situation, and some of the larger u.s.
Attorney's offices treat Main Justice review as a mere formality.F' Nonetheless,
both the prospect and the fact ofreview can affect the conduct ofinvestigations
and prosecutions. Here, as elsewhere, multiple layers of decisionmakers are less
likely to reach extreme results.
Even if Ie offices were staffed with Justice Department prosecutors ran-
domly selected for such a detail, the narrow focus of such units, the freedom
from cost internalization, and the absence of detached review would thus
undermine any claim that the prosecutors were making the same judgments in
their new milieu as they would in their old one. But IC staffs are not randomly
selected. For his part, the IC has complete discretion as to whom he imports
from the Department. Although striving for the appearance ofnonpartisanship,
a partisan Ie would presumably hire similarly minded assistants. There is likely
to be a selection bias on the other side as well, since anyone agreeing to come
from the Department will be fully aware both of the LC's potential target and the
singular nature of the IC's focus. Perhaps a high-minded assistant u.s. Attorney
or Department prosecutor would sign on simply to see that justice is done, but
recruits are more likely to come from the ranks of those hoping to take down
someone in the named subject's office, or the named subject in particular.
Indeed, critics suggested that the members of Starr's staff (regular prosecutors
and new recruits alike) suffered from just this syndrorne.P This point is part of
the larger and often ignored fact that the quality of justice depends to a
significant degree on the quality of the individuals administering it, not simply on
institutional arrangements. For any Investigation of conduct that is close to a
relatively blurred criminal line, as manyinvestigations ofhigh-ranking officials are
likely to be, the outcome of the investigation may well depend on the relative
direction as well, when reviewers press for a more aggressive approach than that taken by the line
prosecutors.
22. See JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR TIlE UNITED STATES:U.S. ATrORNEYS IN TIlE
POLmCAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 116 (1978) ("The size of the office provides the best single
indication of the relationship between a U.S. attorney and the department. The larger the office,
the more likely it is to be . .. ('semiautonomous').").
23. See, e.g.,T.R. Goldman, Proposal to Make DO] Home to Permanent Speaal ProseaaorGathers
Force, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 1, 1999, at 2 (describing the "missionary zeal that many IC staffers bring
to their jobs" and quoting David Vladeck ofthe Public Citizen Litigation Group: "The people who
joined Starr at the senior level wanted to fight the jihad. . . . [f]hese are not disinterested, neutral
career prosecutors."); Daryl Linsey, Cast of Characters, SALON, (Sept. 10, 1998)
<http://www.salon.com/news/1998/09/10sidebar.htm1> (describing connections between Starr's
office and "[tjhe tentacles of billionaire conservative Richard Mellon Scaife and the American
Spectator ...."); Greg Gordon, StOfT's Leading La1l!1ers, Knoll/nfor TOllghness, Have Taken Some Heat,
SACRAMENTO BEE, May 3, ,1998, at A24 (describing criticisms of Starr deputies).
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aggressiveness, diligence, creativity, morality and partisanship of the critical
decision-maker(s).
A final reason why the importation of line prosecutors offers no assurance of
"normality" in the operation of an IC's office is that a partisan IC remains free
to bend them to his will, or to simply overrule them. Although a book in which
all too tnany footnotes blithely rely on "intervie-w-s -with kno-w-Iedgeable source"
may not provide the gold-standard for accuracy, Bob Woodward's recent account
of Starr's operation relates a number of occasions on which Starr overruled line
prosecutors on his staff when they argued for restraint in some aspect of the
Whitewater/Lewinsky investigation.24 While lacking any prior prosecutorial
experience himself, Starr apparendy was willing to reject the advice of his staff
on a broad range ofmatters, including the appropriate scope ofhis investigation,
charging decisions, and the assessment of evidentiary strength.P
Where does this leave us? We want ICs and their staffs to act as much like
regular DO] prosecutors as possible, but the in vitro solution offers no guarantee
of providing a continuity of professional judgment, or even the appearance of
such continuity. If DO] prosecutors are to provide the standard for judging the
performance of ICs, it makes sense to return to square one and ask why DO]
prosecutors can't do the workofICs without leaving the Department, under the
aegis of the Attorney General and her minions. At the outset, we have to
concede the rough empiricism ofour analysis. But this is an area where, as usual,
the resolution of the issue largely turns on where one places the burden. Given
that the IC statute has expired, leaving the field to DO] prosecutors, it seems fair,
at least provisionally, to start by questioning why those prosecutors ought to be
presumptively superseded in certain classes of cases.
WHY NOT DO]?
If we leave DO] prosecutors responsible for investigating and prosecuting
misconduct by high administration officials, what should we be worrying about?
The appropriate course of analysis seems to be pretty straightforward-though
that doesn't mean it has always been used. First, one must identify the risks that
DO] prosecutors will handle these cases inappropriately and the likelihood of
each troubling scenario actually occurring. Second, one must compare these
potential costs with those arising out ofthe alternative institutional arrangements
we have experimentedwith since Watergate. James Fleissner describes the choice
here as a "discretion dilemma"-risking either underzealous investigation by
24. See, e.g., WOODWARD, supranote 19, at 503-04 (describing Starr's rejection ofstaffadvice
concerning the indictment of Julie Hiatt Steele, the Vince Foster documents investigation, the
Travelgate investigation, and the FBI files investigation).
25. Id. For example, "Starr found the evidence [ofperjury] more conclusive than anyone else
in the office." Id: at 419.
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regular prosecutors or overzealous investigation by ICs.26 While this neat
dichotomy may reflect the thinking that spawned the I'C statute-that the risk of
inappropriate inaction by DO] outweighs the risk of inappropriate action by
les-it misses the complex range of pcosecutorial motivations and thus
overstates the risk of DO] underzealousness.
One critical point must be made at the outset: We are very much dealing with
a second-best world, not just because our starting premise is that a high
administration official must be investigated but because the decisions of any
attorney involved in that kind ofinvestigation may be inappropriately skewed by
the desire to "take down" such an official. For prosecutors, this is the pathology
that Tom Wolfe so colorfully described in The Bonfire of/he Vanities as the "Great
White Defendant" problem.27 Having long pursued a steady stream of fungible
defendants, a prosecutor may well jump all too quickly at the opportunity to
advance his career within the profession-even if not within the
government-byaiming at a high-profile target.28 The prospectmay be gratifying
for non-economic reasons as well, promising the sheer thrill ofattacking the high
castle.f" What makes this risk of overzealousness so insidious is that we lack a
26. James P. Fleissner, The Flltllre ofthe Independent COllnselStatllte: Confronting the Dilemma of
Allocating the Power ofProseClitorialDiscretion, 49 MERCERL. REv. 427, 428 (1998). Professor Fleissner
explains that:
If the power is vested in the Attorney General, there is a risk that the power
will be abused when the administration investigates allegations against the
President or other high ranking [govenunent] officials. This risk involves the
administration's receiving favorable treatment from a prosecutor laboring
under a conflict of interest. On the other hand, if the power is vested in an
independent prosecutor, there is a risk that the power will be abused by an
overly aggressive, unchecked, and perhaps politically motivated prosecutor.
This risk involves inappropriate use of the power to investigate and indict by
an unaccountable prosecutor.
Id.
27. TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF TIlE VANITIES 380 (1987).
28. See Gerard E. Lynch & Philip K. Howard, Special Proseaaors: What~ the Point?, WASH.
POST, May 28, 1995, at C7 (explaining that "[t]he real pressures distorting prosecutors' judgment
are the opposite ofwhat reporters and good government editorialists perceive. High officials are
the most tempting targets for young prosecutors. Fame and glory (and ultimately a lucrative private
law practice) come from handling cases in the headlines."); O'Sullivan, slljJra note 16, at 477.
Professor O'Sullivan further explains that:
Regardless of the scope or target of a prosecutor's ambitions, if she is
reasonably bright she will know that there is no surer way of blighting a
promising legalcareer than being implicated in any activity smacking of the
perversion of justice for political ends. . .. Indeed, if ambition plays a role, it
probably would be better served by indicting a big Dante official than by
exonerating hUn.
Id.
29. Seea!so PHILIPB. HEYMANN,THEPOLITICSOF PUBLICMANAGEMENT 102 (1987) ("Law
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metric for determining the influence of such motivation. After all, high
government officials ought to be held to a higher standard of conduct, and
general deterrence is enhanced when conspicuous public figures are targeted.
The fact that lesser folks are not prosecuted for the same conduct does not prove
anything.
We are not chiefly concerned with this probletn here, how-ever, not because
it isn't real, but because our focus is comparative, and there is no reason to
believe that this troubling motivation is more prevalentwithin DOJ than without.
Perhaps line prosecutors who would like to enter private practice with a splash
are somewhat more likely to fall victim to this pathology than are lawyers already
in private practice. But this is like suggesting that poor people are more likely to
steal; it just doesn't get one very far. In a profession that all too easily converts
public exposure to profit, the risks of improper motivations in this regard,
however troubling, seem sufficiendy alike to ignore for our purposes.
Other difficulties with the investigation ofhigh-Ievel executive branch officials
likewise apply, to varying degrees, in both the IC and the DO) contexts. While
a DO) investigation will occur against the backdrop ofother current, former and
future investigations, it will tend to be all-consuming for the individual
prosecutor handling the matter in somewhat the same way as it is for an IC.
Similarly, such investigations will have particular allure for those prosecutors
attracted to landing the big fish, and supervisory personnel will not assign such
cases randomly. Here again, however, because the problems of singular focus
and self-selection are not peculiar to DO) investigations (and indeed are likely
greater in the IC context), they don't weigh against leaving responsibility with
DOJ.
Let us examine two troubling scenarios more specific to the handling ofcases
by DO) prosecutors. One is the Watergate scenario, which figured most
prominendy in the origin of the IC statute: Law enforcement officers accidently
stumble on a case, hand it over to prosecutors, and the ensuing investigation
implicates high government officials, including some, like the Attorney General
and President, with hierarchical power over the enforcement bureaucracy. A
second scenario, presenting the same potential conflicts, follows the Iran-Contra
model: Allegations of misconduct arise not out of an ordinary criminal
investigation, but are uncovered by either the media or legislative investigation.
In this scenario, which may represent the majority of IC matters to date,30 the
enforcement officials take pride in a willingness to go after powerful officials, since it forcefully
confirms a highly valued aspect of their self-image and refutes hated charges of bias, favoritism or
corruptibility.").
30. Cj Colloquy, The Independent COllnsel Process: Is It Broken and How ShollltJ It Be Fixed?, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REv 1515, 1529 (1997) [hereinafter Colloquy, Is It B1'Okeni1 (remarks of former
Attorney General W"tlliam P. Barr) (estimating that U90 percent of [potential independent counsel
matters] come from the newspapers" and explaining that "congressmen then push it to get an
independent counsel named").
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political implications are manifest from the start, both to prosecutors and to the
public. In both scenarios, of course, the fear is not of overzealousness but of
insufficient zeal on the part of prosecutors who have some loyalty to the
administration or who fear some sort of retribution from above if they pursue
the case. Alternatively, even if the prosecutors are not so deterred, their efforts
can be derailed by superiors who deny them necessary support, or take an even
more active role in shutting down the inquiry.
These are the fears, but what is the likelihood of their realization? Although
gross generalities are inescapable when making these empirical predictions, there
are degrees ofgrossness. One way to limit the generality is to distinguish among
prosecutorial types in this regard. First, there is the lawyer whom the two of us
are most familiar with from our tirne in big city u.s. attorneys' offices-the
prosecutor who considers public service to be one phase of a long legal career,
and who is as much concerned with how his conduct is judged by professional
peers outside the government as by those within (if not more SO).31 If anything,
his loyalties and economic incentives will cut toward overzealousness, for the
reasons already discussed. Should he perceive any effort by others within the
government to derail his work, there is no reason to believe that he won't protest,
and, if necessary, whisdeblow.
This lawyer's sense of removal from political pressures will be particularly
strong if he serves in one of those u.s. Attorneys' offices whose size and status
limits the extent to which it can be controlled by Washington. One need not rely
on hypotheticals here. It is no coincidence that U.S. Attorneys' offices of this
sort vigorously prosecuted Vice President Agnew, former Attorney General
Mitchell, and, until superseded by special counsel, doggedly pursued the
Watergate probe.32 Even as it has vastly increased federal prosecutorial authority
and discretion, Congress has taken care to ensure that most of this power stays
decentralized, in the hands ofU.S. Attorneys, who are selected with considerable
31. SeeANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 95-96 (1967) ("[Slome analysts ofbureaus
consider professionals as a separate bureaucratic type because each is more strongly influenced by
his occupation than his organization.") (footnote omitted); FRANCIS E. ROURKE, BUREAUCRACY,
POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 18 (3d ed. 1984) ( "[Pjrofessional organizations' [] dominated by
individuals whose primary commitment is to the skill they practice rather than to the institution by
which they are employed.");JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
Do AND WHY 'fiIEY Do IT 60 (1989) ("In a bureaucracy, professionals are those employees who
receive some significant portion of their incentives from organized groups of fellow practitioners
located outside the agency.").
32. See EISENSTEIN, slljJra note 22, at 209-10 ("The fact that Republican U.S. attorneys
indicted former Attorney GeneralJohn Mitchell, Vice-President Spiro Agnew, and the Republican
chairman in NewJersey illustrates that the current decentralization of the department insulates its
branch offices from potenrial political pressures ...."); O'Sullivan, supra note 16, at 476 (noting that
"[e]xamples ofindifference to political considerations in the U.S. Attorneys' Offices [] are not hard
to come by.") (footnote omitted).
90 Widener Law Symposium Journal [Vol. 5:79
legislative input, and whose responsiveness to presidential authority has
traditionally been quite tempered.33
Further protection against political influences will come from the partnership
that line prosecutors must establish with the agents, most often from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, who will be conducting the investigation with him. At
first blush, this may seem curious; if decentralization plays such a role in
insulating assistant u.s. attorneys, why is insulation enhanced by the participation
of agents from one of the most centralized organizations in the government?
The best answer lies in recent history, which has shown strenuous efforts by
Congress and the Bureau itself to put the agency beyond an Administration's
control. Woodward's book tells of President Bush's bitterness at the FBI sting
launched against his Texas organization during the 1992 presidential campaignr'"
and of President Clinton's annoyance at the distance that FBI Director Louis
Freeh has kept from the White House.35 Freeh, in fact, has proved a politically
painful source of pressure on the Attorney General to appoint an IC in the
campaign finance mvestigation.I" The Bureau thus serves a bonding function,
acting as a relatively apolitical watchdog over line prosecutors, even as its agents
provide investigative assistance.V
O.K., this story of Bureau incorruptibility sounds a little Panglossianr" but
that may not matter for our comparative purposes, where the focus is on
alternative prosecutorial structures, not alternative investigative structures.
Perhaps this focus is mistaken. If the Bureau succumbs to political pressures and
endeavors to derail a case, the nature of the prosecutorial structure probably will
not make any difference. If politically compromised agents control the
information flow, it is hardly likely that an investigation will get off the grourrdr'"
Perhaps, given the proliferation of top drawer private investigative firms,40 we
ought to consider staffing LC offices not with FBI agents (or other federal agents)
but with a pick-up team ofhired snoopers. But while Starr has employed several
33. SeeRichman,slljJranote 17, at 812-13.
34. WOODWARD, sNjJranote 19, at 219-20.
35. Id at 450.
36. SeeNeilA. Lewis, FreehSt!Js Reno ClearfyMisreadProseCNtorLaw,N.Y. TIMES,July 16, 1998,
at Al; see also Richman, slljJranote 17, at 813.
37. See HEYMANN, slljJranote 29, at 100 (concluding that "involvement ofprofessional, career
agents makes less credible charges of political bias in Justice").
38. We don't mean to suggest that the FBI's vigilance in pursuing investigations against
administration officials necessarily extends to investigating its own transgressions. See, e.g., Henry
Ruth, The FBI Investigates Itself-Again, WALLST.J., Monday, Aug. 30, 1999, at A26 col. 3 (criticizing
FBI's internal investigation ofFBI conduct in connection with fire at Branch Davidian Compound
near Waco, Texas).
39. Neither agents nor prosecutors, however politically compromised, will easily bury an
investigation that is born full-blown, like Iran-Contra or Travelgate.
40. See Daniel C. Richman, GrandJury Secreq: Plugging the l-eaks in an Empty Bucket, 36 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 339, 347 (1999) (footnote omitted).
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private investigators." FBI agents have played a significant role both in his
investigation and in virtually every other Ie probe. So long as the participation
of the Bureau is a given, our comparative analysis has to presume that the agency
will zealously pursue any investigation of high administration officials and will
help steel all prosecutors, including line DOJ prosecutors, against improper
political influences. .
In short, at least when line prosecutors fit the mold here described, there is
very little reason to fear that they.will be underzealous in their pursuit of
administration officials. Perhaps this is the real lesson of the Watergate
investigation, which was diligently pursued from the beginning despite the
prospect of administration disfavor.
Not all federal prosecutors fit the mold described above, of course. Both in
U.S. Attorney's offices and at Main Justice, one finds a second type of
prosecutor-the lawyer who intends, at least for the foreseeable future, to stay in
the government. This lawyer's ambitions, if they go beyond performance of his
present duties, may extend only to bureaucratic advancement. As a result, this
lawyer arguably has less incentive to be aggressive, and more incentive to be
circumspect, particularly ifhe envisions that the reigning administration will have
a long run. These are more problems of caution than corruption, however.
Moreover, caving to political pressure is hardly a sure course to bureaucratic
advancement or peer respect, where others are likely to be aware of the
investigation and political winds are certain to shift eventually. Indeed, part of
the culture of career prosecutors, particularly at Main Justice but in u.S.
Attorney's offices as well, is the comfort ofknowing that this administration, too,
shall pass. In our experience, career prosecutors run the gamut from aggressive
to meek, as do short timers. As a general structural matter, there is no significant
reason to fear that a case involving serious criminal allegations against an
executive branch official, assigned to a career prosecutor, will be tanked out of
fear of partisan retribution.
Line prosecutors (career or otherwise) do not have the final say, however, and
in some cases more politically sensitive superiors might try to derail an
investigation for political reasons. As suggested above, however, the prosecutor
seeking peer approval (and fearing peer condemnation) both inside and outside
the government is hardly likely to roll over meekly in such a scenario. It is
difficult (though not impossible) to imagine serious allegations of serious
misconduct being kept from public exposure in this manner. Moreover, the bulk
of Ie-level investigations to date have begun in the public spotlight, as a result
of media or congressional investigation. If responsibility for such matters were
to remain at DO), even the most partisan Attorney General (or subordinate)
would be loathe to terminate them for fear of significant and inevitable political
41. See Cass, supra note 2 (noting that Starr's offices had ten contracts for outside investigative
services);Alison Mitchell, StarrHas HiredEx-FederalAgents in Investigationofefinton, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
29, 1998, at A25.
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cost. A central cause of Nixon's downfall, of course, was his effort to use his
position ofauthority over DO] to end the already public Watergate investigation.
There obviously are situations in which particularDO] prosecutors, from foot
soldiers to Attorney General, should be disqualified for a conflict of interest.V
We certainly do not want a lawyer prosecuting a case, for example, in which a
close friend or relative is a target, in which the lawyer has;'" financial interest, or
which involves a former client,43 These sorts of problems, however, are quite
different from the much broader, generalized concern that DO] lawyers cannot
be trusted to investigate executive branch officials. And, as a general matter, the
Department appears to handle such matters regularly and appropriately.
But what if the Attorney General herselfis the one with the conflict? Suppose
an investigation's target is the President, to whom the AG owes her appointment.
Shouldn't she, and the department that reports to her, step aside? As to the
Attorney General personally, the answer is yes. That situation, much like one in
which the AG's family member (or sworn personal enemy) is involved, raises too
starkly the possibility that her judgment will be affected by inappropriate
considerations.t" The rest of the Department is a different matter, however. We
already have argued that Department lawyers can be trusted to investigate high-
level executive branch officials. The mere fact that their boss has a conflict does
not undermine the foundation of that trust. The premise of DOJ's recusal
approach is that others, often career subordinates with nonpolitical
appointments, can step in and handle the duties of the recused on a temporary
basis. Nothing in DOl's record suggests that it doesn't work that way. Although
the prosecution of administration officials raises conflicts, our point is that the
mere fact that the target is such an official, however high, is not enough by itself
to warrant disqualification of the entire Department ofJustice.
Our analysis so far has assumed that cases against high administration officials
would be handled within the Department like any other case. And very often
they should be, or at least could be. But the fact is that Attorneys General (and
sometimes Presidents), without any statutory obligation, have regularly appointed
special prosecutors to investigate matters that they felt ill-equipped to handle,
42. The United States Attorneys' Manual addresses, in general terms, both the circumstances
requiring recusal of U.S. Attorneys and their subordinates and the procedures to be followed in
accomplishing such recusal. SII USAM, slljJra note 20, §§ 3-2.170, 3-2.171, 3-2.220.
43. SeeUSAM, slljJra note 20, § 3-2.170 ("Ifa conflict exists because a United States Attorney
has a personal interest in the outcome of the matter or because he/she has or had a professional
relationship with parties or counsel, or for other good cause, he/she should recuse
himself/herself."); id: § 3-2.220 ("The same circumstances which require that a United States
Attorney recuse himself/herself ... apply to an Assistant United States Attorney.").
44. Cj id: § 3-2.170; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 1.7(b) (1999) (with
limited exceptions, "[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the
lawyer's own interests ....").
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includingTeapotDome, the Truman Administration tax scandals, loans toJimmy
Carter's peanut warehouse, Watergate and Whitewater.45 While some of these
appointments undoubtedly were made out of felt political necessity rather than
genuine concern about avoiding conflicts, they do demonstrate that a mechanism
for taking matters outside the Department not only has always been available but
also will often be used.
Following the demise of the Independent Counsel provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act, Attorney General Reno promulgated regulations designed to
regularize the appointment and operation of "special counsel.T'? According to
the Department, these regulations are designed to "strike a balance between
independence and accountability in certain sensitive investigations, recognizing
that there is no perfect solution to the problem.Y" These regulations indeed may
not be perfect-they appear, for exainple, to grant "special counsel" considerably
less independence from DOJ oversight than that granted ad hoc special
prosecutors in the past.48 Nevertheless, they reflect the institutionalizing of a
time-honored departmental practice of bringing in outside investigators where
appropriate. Moreover, the notion that an Attorney General will be able to cover
up serious criminal activity ofhigh-Ievel officials by strong-arming special counsel
simply blinks political reality'? (not to mention Watergate).
Critics of the new regulations, and proponents of an independent counsel
mechanism, might ask why, if there are matters that warrant recusal of the entire
Department, we shouldn't protect against an Attorney General's failure to
properly identify such matters by replacing her discretion with a statute or
regulation that mandates appointment of an outsider. We offer two related
reasons. First, identifying exantea meaningful class ofcases that deserves outside
handling is extraordinarily difficult, and is prone to the dramatic
overinclusiveness of The Ethics in Government Act's "covered persons"
45. See KAlYJ.HARRIGER, INDEPENDENTJUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
IN AMERICAN POLITICS 13-39, 124-26 (1992); if:Colloquy, Is It Broken?, slljJra note 30, at 1532-33
(remarks offormer Attorney General ~tlliamP. Barr) (describing ad hoc use of"inherent authority
as Attorney General" to bring in outsiders to conduct or oversee sensitive investigations).
46. SeeAppointment ofSpecial Counsel Regulations for Department ofJustice, Office ofthe
Attorney General, 64 FED. REG. 37,038 (1999) (to be codified as 28 C.F.R. § 600.1 et seq.)
47.Id
48. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R § 600.7(b) (1999) (requiring special counsel to provide, upon request
by Attorney General, "explanation for any investigative or prosecutorial step," and authorizing
Attorney General "after review to conclude that the action is so inappropriate or unwarranted under
established Departmental practices that it should not be pursued."). For a critical analysis of the
new regulations, see John P. MacKenzie, Lift After SlInset, 5 WIDENERL. SYMP.J. 99 (2000).
49 . See Dick Polman, Intlepentknt COllnselLaw is Dying Friendless, PHILA. INQ., June 27, 1999,
at E1 (quoting former Independent Counsel and u.s. AttorneyJoseph diGenova: "If charges of
wrongdoing are serious enough, if the Geiger counter starts to click, the public will demand a full
and independent investigation, the press and Congress will scream- and it will be impossible for
any attorney general to control it for political reasons.").
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approach. Second, because special prosecutors are threatened by the same
singularity of focus problems as ICs, their use ought to be presumptively
disfavored, not encouraged.
We are not so narve as to suppose that leaving discretion in the Attorney
General is without risk-her ability to ignore conflicts is largely unreviewable
except at the level of politics. Of course, the sarrie appears to be true of the
decision not to refer a matter to an independent counsel.t" Rather our claim
(speculative, as always) is that the risk ofAG abuses in this regard is low, and that
the disruption caused by trying to carve out those cases in advance (as with the
IC statute) is far too costly. And, in the end, maybe even a modicum of trust is
appropriate here. As Madison suggested:
As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of
circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which
justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government
presupposes the existence ofthese qualities in a higher degree than any other fonn.
'W'ere the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy ofsome among
us faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would be that there is
not sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that nothingless than
the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one
another.51
THE ApPEARANCE FACTOR
One response to the foregoing defense of DO] rectitude is that the real
problem is one of apparent, not actual, conflict of interest.V Even if the
50. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 36, and Richman, supra note 17, at 813 (discussing Attorney
General's decision not to refer campaign finance investigation to an IC).
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 346 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Not
surprisingly, there is a Madison quote employed by the pro-IC forces as well:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be
necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over
men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to
control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A
dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the
government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
precautions.
Id. No. 51, at 322 (James Madison), quoted in Colloquy, A Roundtable Discussion on the Independent
Counsel Statute, 49 MERCER L. REv. 457, 463 (1998) [hereinafter Colloquy, A Roundtable DisCllssion]
(statement of lloyd Cutler). For what it's worth, the framers did not include an independent
counsel mechanism in the Constitution's arsenal of "auxiliary precautions."
52. "The intent of the special prosecutor provisions is not to impugn the integrity of the
Attorney General or the Department ofJustice. Throughout our system of justice, safeguards exist
against actual or perceived conflicts of interest without reflecting adversely on the parties who are
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Attorney General and line prosecutors can in fact be trusted to investigate
executive-branch officials with vigor, the argument runs, the public inevitablywill
suspect that any result favorable to such officials was tainted by partisan in-
fluence. That means we must mandate an investigation ron from outside DOJ.
Lloyd Curler put the point starkly: "The Attorney General's appearance of
impartiality and independence is simply gone for our generation.t'f" This
position, at the very least, has some rhetorical appeal: What could be wrong with
playing it safe and avoiding, in the words of the old ethics rules, even "the
appearance of impropriety?" The central (and by now obvious) difficulty with
this position is that the IC mechanism has generated its own, perhaps greater,
appearance-of-partiality problem. Whether or not the appointment process is
politicized,54 the political motivations ofany and every Independent Counsel are
now fully in play, so that even a truly nonpartisan IC will be subject to partisan
attacks of partiality once an investigation heats Up.55 Far from promoting the
appearance ofneutrality in criminal investigations, the IC mechanism has simply
fueled the now-accurate perception that the investigation ofhigh-rankingpolitical
figures has become as much politics as anything else.
A second and more speculative response to the appearance argument is that
by regularly resorting to ICs, we undermine rather than promote trust in our
public institutions. While local district attorneys prosecute the vast majority of
this country's crimes, the Department ofJustice is and will remain our nation's
primary criminal justice organization. The existence of the IC mechanism tells
the citizenry that there is a class of cases in which the Department ofJustice,
subject to conflicts."S. REp. No. 97-496, at 6 (1982). But see, e.g.,139 CONG. REc. S425-26 (dailyed.
Jan. 21, 1993) (statement of Sen. Cohen) ("I believe that an institutional mechanism, such as the
independent counsel law, will always be necessary to guard against inherent conflicts ofinterest that
[will] occur whenever the executive branch is called upon to investigate itself.''); Colloquy, Is It
Broken?, supra note 30, at 1598 (statement of Congressman Hyde) (explaining that IC mechanism
is necessary to avoid an "inherent conflict of interest with a prosecutor who is a political appointee
trying to prosecute or investigate her patron or his patron").
53. Colloquy, A Rollndtable Discussion, supra note 51, at 464.
54. CtJohn Q. Barrett, SpecialDivision Agonistes, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP.J. 17 (2000) (examining,
interalia, actual and perceived roles ofSpecial Division in appointing ICs); W-tlliam Michael Treanor,
IndependentColinseland V«orom InvestigationandProsecution, 61 LAw &CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 153-57
(1998) (examining process of selecting Ies and special prosecutors).
55. Cf. Lynch & Howard, supra note 28, at C7 (drawing lesson from Walsh and Starr
investigations that "fp]artisan arguments intrude into all decisions involving the political arena").
The appointment of Starr's successor, Robert Ray, has brought yet another round of partisan
wrangling. See Don Van Natta,Jr., Starr's SliccessorSworn In To OverseeClinton In'llliry, N.Y. nMES,
Oct. 19, 1999, at A20 ("Even before Mr. Ray was sworn in, White House aides had begun calling
reporters to contend that Mr. Ray had a conflict of interest because he had once been hired as a
Federal prosecutor by Rudolph W. Giuliani, who may face Mrs. Clinton in the New York Senate
race."); Neil A. Lewis, Aide to Stan-Successor Rgects Conflict Claim Involving Giuliani, N.Y. nMES, Oct.
20, 1999, at A23.
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because of corrupting political influence, cannot be trusted to be vigilant, and
further that the Department cannot be trusted to identify those cases on its
own.56 The harm from this bleak, debilitating, and, we believe, mistaken message
has been immeasurably compounded by the frequency of calls for and actual
referrals to ICs.57 What lesson does this teach with respect to DO] (and other
prosecutors' offices) generally? Political favor can operate on a rrnrch srnaller
scale than presidents intimidating (or cajoling) attorneys general, and there is no
shortage of nonpolitical potentially corrupting influences. The pro-IC
appearance argument, while seductive, should be resisted. Ifwe want the public
to trust critical government institutions, then we should begin by trusting those
institutions to act appropriately in situations ofpossible conflicts ofinterest, not
by assuming their incapacity.
WHAT Now?
When Congress again takes up the question of how best to govern the
governors, it will not want for alternatives. While the IC statute died with few
visible public supporters (perhaps as much a testament to dissatisfaction with the
Walsh and/or Starr investigations as with the statute itself), adherents to the
concept have suggested a wide range of largely salutary modifications.58
Dramatically reducing the list of "covered persons," raising the showing needed
before the appointment of an IC will be required, limiting coverage to
misconduct in office, and increasing IC accountability, taken together, would
ameliorate many of the problems associated with IC investigations. Indeed, had
the IC statute been born with those components in place, it would certainly still
bealive today. That being the case, why shouldn't we just revamp the statute?
56. SII, I.g.,S. REp. No.103-1 01, at 11 (1993) (statement ofSen. Dole) ("We're not enhancing
'confidence in government' when Congress presumes, as it presumes through the independent
counsel statute, that the Attorney General lacks the integrity to conduct a fair and thorough
investigation of another executive branch official."); id: (statement of former Attorney General
Katzenbach) (concluding that Ie statute, "contrary to its purpose, has served to destroy rather than
preserve public confidence in the integrity of the government in general and the Department of
Justice in particular. The statute assumes conclusively that with respect to a broad range of senior
government officials the Attorney General cannot be trusted to enforce the law objectively ...");
Colloquy, A Rollndtabk Discmsion, slljJra note 51, at 465 (statement of former Attorney General
Griffin Bell) ("I think you just cause the people to distrust the Department ofJustice. The more
special counsels we have, the less people think of the Department.").
57. See O'Sullivan, slljJra note 16, at 470. "The public perception seems to be that when an
allegation ofwrongdoing of any kind is made against a high-ranking political figure and is pressed
by his or her political foes, someone impartial must sort it out." Id.
58. See, e.g.,Erwin Chemerinsky, Learning the Wrong Lessons From History: W~ There Must bean
Independent CounselLaw, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP.J. 1 (2000); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Constitutional
Independent Counsel StatNte, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 111 (2000); Ken Gormley, An OriginalModelofthe
Independent CounselStatute, 97 MICH. L. REv. 601 (1998).
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Our answer here (given, we hope, with the right number of qualifications) is,
first, that proponents of an I'C statute have failed to demonstrate a need for that
mechanism. Neither fear of underzealous efforts by DO] prosecutors nor an
unexamined appeal to appearance does the trick. As a result, we would prefer to
leave prosecutorial responsibility with DO], an approach that seemed to work
remarkably well before passage of the Ethics in Government Act.
Second, it is far too late to go back to the beginning, to get partisan politics
out of the criminal investigation of high administration officials. No matter
who's doing the investigating, and no matter what direction such an investigation
takes, its exploitation for partisan political ends seems certain. A target feeling
pressure will attack the investigation as partisan; political opponents of a target
being treated favorably will do the same. What we face is not a choice between
underzealous regular prosecutors and overzealous ICs,59 but rather the
inevitability of charges (fair and unfair) of partisan underzealousness or
overzealousness, depending on whose ox is being gored at the moment. To be
sure, many IC investigations have avoided this politicization, but largely because
of their lack ofpolitical significance. As Julie O'Sullivan perceptively observed,
LC handling of low-profile matters tends to work well but is unnecessary, while
IC handling ofhigh-profile matters tends to "intensify the politicization of [such]
investigations."60 Reducing the list of covered persons to the President and Vice
President, therefore, will not fix the problem. Moreover, we are inclined to
follow trends rather than averages here. We simply cannot put the genie of
partisan attacks on the prosecutor back in the bottle. The Department ofJustice,
an institution dominated by professional prosecutors and investigators with a
relatively thin overlay of political appointees and with a lengthy track record of
nonpartisan work, is far better equipped to withstand such attacks than is a one-
shot independent counsel.
One final thought: As an effort to counter the politicization of criminal
justice, the I'C statute failed miserably. Indeed, it fostered an ever graver
problem-the criminalization of politics. By giving the opposition party an
apparendy apolitical home for its political complaints, any IC mechanism
threatens to color ordinary political disputes with an unwarranted criminal hue.
Let's keep the distinction between politics and crime as distinct as possible by
letting the Department ofJustice decide what and whom to prosecute. If the
Department stumbles, it (and the entire executive branch, including the President
and the Attorney General) remains subject to political checks. There may also
be a margin for error here: If the absence of an I'C statute means that a
democratically elected President will be able to avoid, during his term in office,
facing charges meager enough that, when aired by opponents and/or the media,
they generate insufficient pressure to force the Department's hand, we are not
quite sure that real damage has been done.
59. SeeFleissner, slljJra note 26 and accompanying text.
60. O'Sullivan, slljJra note 16, at 475.

